

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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O 020452Z AUG 76

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6854

S E C R S J T ISLAMABAD 7858

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BYROADE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PK, US, MNUC, PARM

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT - NUCLEARSMATTERS

1. AS PREVIOUSLY, I WILL BE SENDING SOME THOUGHTS FOR YOU RE YOUR COMING TALKS WITH BHUTTO SO THAT IT WILL BE ACCESSIBLE TO YOU IN YOUR PLANE BEFORE YOUR ARRIVAL HERE. I AM SENDING THIS ONE ON NUCLEAR MATTERS IN ADVANCE BECAUSE IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO YOU BEFORE YOUR TALKS START WITH THE SHAH. IT MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL IF YOUR STAFF WOULD HAVE ISLAMABAD 5737 ON THE PLANE AND REREAD AGAIN THAT PORTION WHICH CONTAINS BHUTTO'S REMARKS TO ME AS HE PROBABLY WILL SAY SOME OF THESE SAME THINGS TO YOU.

2. I HAD ANOTHER LONG TALK WITH BHUTTO RECENTLY IN BALUCHISTAN ON THIS SUBJECT AND BELIEVE IT WAS A FRUITFUL ONE. IT IS REVEALING IN ITSELF HOW THE SUBJECT CAME UP. IN A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON SUBJECTS THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR YEU AND HIM TO DISCUSS, I TOLD HIM OF YOUR OWN EFFORTS TO MOVE OUR BUREAUCRACY IN HANDLING IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER SOME SIR OR SEVEN REMAINING PAKISTANI MILITARY SUPPLY REQUESTS WHICH WE HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY RESPONDED TO. I SAID WE WERE NOW IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE AND I THOUGHT HIS MILITARY WAS IN GENERAL SATISFIED WITH THE PACE OF OUR REACTION. I SAID OF COURSE THIS DID NOT INCLUDE THE A-7 WHICH I ASSUMED HE WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT. TO MY SURPRISE

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HE SAID "NO". HE SAID IF I DO, WE WILL GET INTO THE RE-

PROCESSING ISSUE AND HE JUST DID NOT WANT ANYTHING UNPLEASANT  
IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR VISIT.

3. I TOLD BHUTTO THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT YOU HADHN MIND,  
BUT THAT I FELT CERTAIN SDU WOULD FEEL FYAT DISCUSSIONS ON  
THPJ SUBJECT SHORLD TAKE PLACE AND THAT I, FOR ONE, FELT  
IT LESS DANGEROUS THAT THE MATTER BE FRANKLY DISCUSSED RATHER  
THAN PUSHED UNDER THE RUG. AT THE END OF THE LENGTHY TALK  
THAT FOLLOWED HE SAID HE AGREED WITH THAT ANALYSIS. YOU  
NEED NOT BE CONCERNED THAT WE TALKED FRANKLY ON SUCH A  
SUBJECT AS HE KNOW THAT I AM NOT AN EXPERT IN THIS FIELD  
AND IT IS DOBLY CLEAR TO HIM THAT I AM TALKING ON MY  
OWN WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. HE KNOW THAT YOU HANDLE  
THIS ONE YOURSELF, AND THAT I DO NOT, REPEAT NOT, KNOW  
WHAT YOU WILL SAY ON THE SUBJECT HERE. I HAVE CONTINUED

TO AGONIZE WITH  
HIM ON THIS SUBJECT WITH THE DELIBERATE  
MOTIVE, WHICH HE ALSO KNOWS, OF TRYING TO GET HIM TO  
THINK OF WHAT ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE.

4. I HAVE ALSO HAD ANOTHER  
MOTIVE IN KEEPING TALKS ON  
THIS SUBJECT GOING. HE HAS ONLY HEARD FROM US OFFICIALLY  
ON THIS SUBJECT TWICE-ONCE WITH YOU DURING HIS EARLY  
1975 VISIT TO WASHINGTON, AND PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER TO  
HIM OF MARCH 21. SINCE THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING FROM US IN  
THE FOUR MONTHS FOLLOWING, I FEARED HE MIGHT BEGIN TO THINK  
THIS A LOW PRIORITY SUBJECT. IN ORDER TO PREVENT SURPRISE  
AND CONFUSION, PERHAPS WHILE YOU ARE HERE, I GHUGHT IT BEST  
FOR HIM TO KNOW THAT I DID NOT IN ANY WAY BELIEVE IT A CLOSED  
SUBJECT.

5. I THINK MY IMPRESSIONS OF BHUTTO'S STATE OF MIND ON  
THIS SUBJECT WILL BE MORE VALUABLE TO YOU THAN ANY LENGTHY  
RUN DOWN OF SPECIFICS AS TO OUR DISCUSSION. BHUTTO WAS EDGY  
ON THIS SUBJECT, EVEN WITH ME, UNTIL OUR TALK IN JUNE  
REPORTED IN ABOVE REFTEL. HE IS NOT THAT WAY ANYMORE.  
MY NET CONCLUSION IS THAT BHUTTO THINKS HE HAS MADE A  
MISTAKE ON THIS ONE, AND THAT HE WAS THE RECIPIENT  
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OF BAD ADVISE ON HAVING GOTTEN INTO IT IN THE FIRST  
PLACE. IF THIS IS TRUE, IT IS OF COURSE A VERY IMPORTANT  
THING FOR YOU TO KNOW. I CAN ONLY TELL YOU THAT I THINK  
IT IS TRUE, BUT I CANNOT BE ABSOLWZELY CERTAIN THAT THAT  
IS THE CASE.

6. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PROFITABLE FOR YOU TO CONCENTRATE  
YOUR OWN THINKING ON THE TWO ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM WHICH

I BELIEVE TROUBLES BHUTTO THE MOST. THE FIRST WOULD BE EMBARRASSMENT ON HIS PART OVER ANY MOVE TO CANCEL OUT WITH THE FRENCH. THIS IS A VERY PERSONAL THINK WITH HIM. HE SAID " WHAT KIND OF MAN WOULD I TURN OUT TO BE IF I DID THAT. D'ESTAING AND PERSONALLY SHOOK HANDS ON THE DEAL AND WE BOTH SAID TO EACH OTHER THAT WE WOULD ALLOW THING TO INTERFERE OR IMPEDE CARRYING OUT THIS PROJECT. I DON'T BELIEVE YOU HAVE REALLY THOUGHT THROUGH WHAT YOU SEEM TO BE SUGGESTING TO ME." I TOLD HIM I HAD NOT KNOWN THE EXTENT OF HIS PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT. MY OWN FEELING HAD BEEN THAT THE FRENCH HAD SOMEWHAT OF A SPLIT PERSONALITY ON THIS SUBJECT. ON THE ONE HAND THERE WERE VERY IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL BUSINESS INTERESTS, WHILE ON THE OTHER A GROWING CONCERN OVER PROLIFERATION HAZARDS. I ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT HE PROBABLY KNEW THE FRENCH BETTER THAN I DID.

7. THE OTHER PROBLEM FOR BHUTTO IS HIS POLITICAL IMAGE IN PAKISTAN. AS A POLITICIAN HE JUST COULD NEVER FACE UP TO ANY HINT OF HAVING MADE A MISTAKE. IF WE WERE CLEVER ENOUGH TO THINK UP SOME KIND OF PACKAGE THAT HE COULD POINT TO AS AN ALTERNATIVE AND PLAY IT AS GOOD FOR PAKISTAN, I THINK THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT WE WOULD BE HOME FREE. HE WOULD, I THINK, STILL CONSIDER IT A DANGEROUS PROPOSITION FOR HIM THAT OUR OWN PRESS AND PERHAPS EVEN OUR OWN STATEMENTS ON THE HILL, ETC. WOULD PLAY IT SO THAT IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE CAPITULATION TO THE UNITED STATES. HE WOULD WANT TO FEEL, I THINK, THAT WE WOULD PROTECT HIM ON THAT SCORE AS BEST WE COULD.  
BYROADE

SECRET

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